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We study a firm that makes new products in the first period and uses returned cores to make remanu-
factured products (along with new products) in future periods. The remanufactured product is differen-
tiated from the new product, so the firm needs to choose differentiated prices. We analyze the monopoly
environment in two-period, multi-period (three, four and five) and infinite planning horizons, and char-
acterize the optimal remanufacturing and pricing strategy for the firm. In the process, we identify reman-
ufacturing savings thresholds that determine the production and pricing strategy for the firm. Among
other results, we find—counter to intuition—that in a finite-horizon, multi-period setting, the optimal
policy is not necessarily monotone in remanufacturing savings.
Published by Elsevier B.V.1. Introduction
Remanufacturing is a process in which used products are disas-
sembled, and their parts are repaired and used in the production of
new products. Remanufactured products often serve entry-level
customers that are attracted by the brand, but do not wish to
pay the price of a new product—as with used cars. A successful
remanufacturing operation often adopts high quality standards
that allow it to offer products that enhance brand equity and keep
customers loyal. Often, the company expands its market coverage
by offering remanufactured products at a low price, side-by-side
with the new products. A well-designed product line that includes
remanufactured and new products may increase market share
while sustaining a high profit margin. An organization will find it
most economical to remanufacture equipment that satisfies the
following conditions: it is owned in large quantities (economies-
of-scale requirement); all units have the same configuration
(learning curve requirement); all units can be brought to current
state of technology (non-obsolescence requirement). The US
Department of Defense consistently remanufactures most of its
valuable assets (propulsion units, vehicles, radar systems) pre-
cisely because they satisfy these conditions. In fact, remanufactur-
ing has been recognized in many government reports as an
economical way to maintain all fleets at desirable levels (US DoD,
2005).
This study is concerned with the remanufacturing operation
from the supplier’s viewpoint. We analyze a monopoly model inB.V.which the remanufactured and the original products are clearly
distinguishable. We develop models for several planning horizons,
such that the manufacturer produces just the new product in the
first period, but has the option of making new and remanufactured
products in subsequent periods. Pricing decisions impact the
dynamics across periods in such cases. For example, if the price
is high in the first period, profits in the first period might increase;
but, the number of reusable products available in the second per-
iod decreases, thereby reducing second period profit potential.
However, if the price is low in the first period, initial profits might
decrease, but the firm has better remanufacturing opportunity in
future periods.
We start by deriving the optimal quantities and prices for such
an operation, and characterize the optimal conditions for a monop-
olist that offers both product types, unconstrained by the availabil-
ity of cores, characterizing the strategic regions of operation. Then,
we analyze models constrained by core availability. We introduce
the infinite-horizon model, assuming steady behavior in the sec-
ond period and beyond. Finally, we introduce the multi-period
problem with limited planning horizon and discuss the initializa-
tion and the end-gaming behavior. We provide analytical insights
for all cases.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we
discuss the related literature and our contributions. In Section 3,
we present our model and results. In Section 3.1, we present the
infinite-horizon, and in Section 3.2, we analyze the two-period
planning horizon. In Section 3.3, we study the multi-period
planning horizon—focusing in particular on three-, four- and five-
period horizons. We conclude in Section 4.
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Buy-backs, trade-ins and leasing schemes provide market ben-
efits to the manufacturer that are not trivial. These benefits have
raised the question: what is the optimal sales strategy of a com-
pany making a durable product to improve its potential profits?
How should buy-back and leases be considered? In an early study,
Levinthal and Purohit (1989) provide a two-period model that de-
scribes a monopolist company selling a durable product for which
it may subsequently introduce an improved version. In a situation
like this, the customers will expect a forthcoming product, and as a
result, will lower the price they are willing to pay for the current
product due to its expected loss in value. A buy-back policy is
found to be more profitable for large improvements, whereas the
policy to phase-out sales of the old product is optimal for modest
levels of improvement. Purohit (1992) examines the situation in
which technology changes rapidly, and the new versions of a prod-
uct make earlier versions obsolete. However, when the products
are durable, there is the possibility of secondary markets for used
products as well as for outdated products. These examples can be
found everywhere today—particularly in computer and high-tech
industries. Purohit develops a model to explore the relationship
between primary and secondary markets for automobiles. The re-
sults suggest that the depreciation of old models is influenced
strongly by the types of changes in new models. In related re-
search, Hendel and Lizzeri (1999) propose a model in which con-
sumers have heterogeneous valuations for quality; thus, the
used-good markets play an allocative role to address the interfer-
ence introduced by the first market on the secondary market of a
monopolist company. Market-related issues in remanufacturing
are related to discussions of other secondary distribution/segmen-
tation channels, as found in Purohit and Staelin (1994). They pro-
vide different policies to increase the total manufacturer’s profit
in a two-period model that compares buy-back and lease schemes.
There is also great interest in supply-chain coordination to max-
imize multi-period profits. Moorthy and Png (1992), Kim and
Chhajed (2002), and Krishnan and Zhu (2006) develop quality-
based models for new product development with multiple market
segments under different marketing and manufacturing consider-
ations. Desai et al. (2002) study the coordination problem between
manufacturer and retailer of durable products which arises from
the potential competition from a secondary market in future peri-
ods. In another two-period model, Desai et al. (2007) evaluate how
a manufacturer decides first period production level under sto-
chastic demand, with excess production carry-over to second
period.
The literature on the economics of remanufacturing has seen
important contributions in the study of supply-chain coordination
(Corbett and Savaskan, 2002; Savaskan et al., 2004; Savaskan and
Van Wassenhove, 2006), collection and leasing (Guide et al.,
2003; Ray et al., 2005; Heese et al., 2005; Qu and Williams,
2008; Liang et al., 2009). The research in this field is rapidly evolv-
ing, as witnessed by the many special issues and technical books
(Corbett and Kleindorfer, 2001; Dekker et al., 2004; Fleischmann
et al., 2004; Flapper et al., 2005). For an extensive review of the re-
verse logistics literature, an interested reader may refer to Fleisch-
mann et al. (1997) and Guide et al. (2000).
Debo et al. (2005) develop a multi-period, infinite-horizon mod-
el to price remanufactured goods and to determine the product
technology a priori to maximize the profitability of the market seg-
mentation. Majumder and Groenevelt (2001) describe a two-peri-
od model where the original-equipment manufacturer (OEM) may
choose to remanufacture in the second period or not. The reverse
logistics process is based on the ‘‘shell allocation mechanism” ob-
served in the respective market. Four of these mechanisms are con-sidered: whether one or the other player (the OEM and the
independent operator) can or cannot use the cores that are not uti-
lized by the other company. Ferrer and Swaminathan (2006) ex-
pand on the above model and characterize the optimal strategies
(production quantities and prices) in monopoly and duopoly envi-
ronments for two-period, multi-period and infinite-horizon set-
tings. One of the main findings is that if the profit margin in
remanufacturing reaches defined threshold, then the firm reduces
the price in the first period in order to sell more units and increase
the number of available cores in the following periods. They also
prove that, if the savings of one party from remanufacturing is high
enough compared other parties, the original organization remanu-
factures all available cores that it collects. Furthermore, they show
that for most practical environments, the optimal strategies ob-
tained for the two-period problem are quite similar to the results
of multi-period problems. Ferguson and Toktay (2006) formulate
a two-period model to examine the recovery strategy of the OEM
in the face of a competitor. In the first part of the paper, they show
the cannibalization effect of the remanufactured products on the
original products. In the second part, they present two entry-deter-
rent strategies that the OEM may follow in order to keep the
remanufacturer away from the market. The results show that the
OEM may remanufacture (after collecting the cores) or collect the
cores, but not remanufacture (preemptive collection) based on fac-
tors such as collection or remanufacturing cost.
It is worth mentioning the increasing literature on closed-loop
supply chain that is generally concerned with managing the inven-
tory of used cores to meet the needs of the remanufacturing pro-
cess, either in quantities, quality or both. Recent examples
include Choi et al. (2007), Konstantaras and Papachristos (2007),
Teunter et al. (2008), Visich et al. (2007), Zikopoulos and Tagaras
(2007) and Zikopoulos and Tagaras (2008). The tutorial by Souza
summarizes some of the key components of these models (Souza,
2008).
In most of the above literature, it is assumed that remanufac-
tured and original products are not distinguishable, and in those
that study differentiated products, the analysis is restricted to
two periods. However, the remanufactured products are often of-
fered as an alternative to the original products with lower price
and/or quality. For example, there are a number of industries such
as computer systems, auto components and office equipment in
which the reconditioned product is priced lower than original
products in order to capture the demand in different markets (Fer-
rer, 1997; Ayres et al., 1997). Robotis et al. (2005) analyze the case
of a reseller who procures cores which have an older technology
and then either resells a fraction of these cores in ‘‘as is” condition
(in a developing market) or remanufactures the cores and then
sells them at a higher price. They show that the number of col-
lected cores decreases when the reseller utilizes remanufacturing
and, depending on the cost structure, it might be always more
profitable to remanufacture the collected cores.
Incorporating the distinguished (or quality differentiated) nat-
ure of remanufactured products complicates the problem substan-
tially, since there is one more lever (related to price differentiation)
that needs to be considered. In this paper, we study a firm that
makes new products in the first period and uses returned cores
to make remanufactured products (along with new products) in fu-
ture periods. The remanufactured product is differentiated from
the new product, so the firm needs to choose differentiated prices.
We present the multi-period (three, four and five) planning hori-
zons and show their relationship with past analysis with the
two-period and the infinite planning horizon. In all cases, we char-
acterize the remanufacturing savings thresholds that define the
optimal remanufacturing quantity and price strategy for the firm.
Among other results, we find (counter to intuition) that in a
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essarily monotone in remanufacturing savings, alternating periods
of high and low production of new products in order to exploit the
greater profits that can be obtained with a remanufactured
product.
3. Monopolist with differentiated products
Customers distinguish the remanufactured from the new prod-
ucts made by the monopolist. Hence, the market is better served
under price discrimination that allows the customer to choose
the product that generates the greater utility. This situation repre-
sents, for instance, the tire retreading industry. Although the
industry is generally characterized by intense competition, some
specialty tires have few suppliers (aircraft landing gears, off-road
construction rigs, race cars and other specialty uses) that face al-
most monopolistic privileges. We model this environment,
describing a monopolist that makes just the new product in period
1 and both new and remanufactured products in subsequent peri-
ods. We use the following notation:
3.1. Variables and parameters
Q Size of the potential market, constant every period.
pi;jqi;j Price charged ðpÞ and quantity demanded ðqÞ for product j
in period i. The subscripts are i ¼ 1;2; . . . and j ¼ N (new)
or R (remanufactured). In the first period, only the new
product is made, and j is usually omitted (p1 ¼ p1N and
q1 ¼ q1N). The demand function is assumed to be linearly
decreasing in price.
c s Marginal cost to make a new product ðcÞ and cost savings
per remanufactured product ðsÞ. The marginal cost to make
a remanufactured product is c  s.
c Core collection yield ðc  1Þ, defined as the fraction of new
products made in period i that is available for remanufac-
turing in period iþ 1. Hence, qiR  cðqi1;NÞ.
b Discount factor per period ðb  1Þ. The discount rate in-
creases as b decreases. E.g., if the discount rate = 5%, than
b ¼ 0:95.
a Customers’ tolerance for the remanufactured product
ða  1Þ, defined as a fraction of the utility provided by
the new product.
Two of these parameters, remanufacturing savings ðsÞ and col-
lection yield ðcÞ, characterize the firm’s ability to perform key
remanufacturing activities. The cost parameter ðcÞ characterizes
the firm’s ability to make new products. The discount factor ðbÞ
encompasses both the value of the money and the time between
two cycles. It is closely related to the product’s technological obso-
lescence. We select the remanufacturing savings ðsÞ as the key
parameter to describe the strategy space in each scenario that
we analyze, because it seems to be the parameter over which man-
agers can have the greatest impact through strategic management
of the facility’s resources.
In what follows, we present a useful lemma that describes the
self-selection quantities associated with the prices of the new
and remanufactured products.
Lemma 1. Suppose that two competing products, new (N) and
remanufactured (R), are in the market. Let there be Q potential
consumers, characterized by the variable z 2 ð0;QÞ uniformly distrib-
uted in this domain, according to their valuation of the new product.
Let a 2 ð0;1Þ indicate the customers’ tolerance for the remanufactured
product. Large values of a indicate that customers accept the
remanufactured product better than if a is small. The utility that a
consumer of type z enjoys when buying the product is
UNðzÞ ¼ ðzÞ  pN (new) or URðzÞ ¼ az pR (remanufactured). Ifa 2 ½pR=pN;1 ðpN  pRÞ=Q , the number of consumers buying each
product type is:
qNðpN ;pRÞ ¼
ð1 aÞQ  pN þ pR
1 a ; ð1Þ
qRðpN;pRÞ ¼
apN  pR
að1 aÞ : ð2Þ
If a < pR=pN; qR ¼ 0 and qN ¼ Q  pN. If a > 1 ðpN  pRÞ=Q ; qR ¼
Q  pR=a and qN ¼ 0.
Proof. See Ferrer and Swaminathan (2006). h
Eqs. (1) and (2) are similar to the demand functions in a Ber-
trand duopoly: the demand for new products increases when their
price decreases or when the price of remanufactured products in-
creases, and vice-versa. Lemma 1 provides the coefficients for the
Bertrand demand function, identifying how customers select either
product. Using this result, we can express the quantities sold as
functions of the behavior-inducing prices. Since the monopolist
would only consider prices that would lead to non-negative de-
mand, we may disregard prices that would cause
a R ½pN=pR;1 ðpN  pRÞ=ðQÞ.
Based on Eqs. (1) and (2), we are able to define the optimal pol-
icy of a monopolist offering a portfolio of a new and a remanufac-
tured product for a single period, unconstrained by an existing
supply of cores.The profit function would be:
Max
pN ;pR
ððpN  cÞqN þ ðpR  c þ sÞqRÞ;
subject to
qN  0; and
qR  0;
where qN and qR are given by Eqs. (1) and (2), respectively. It is triv-
ial to show that the monopolist should choose one of the following
quantities, depending on the operating parameters:
qN ¼ Qc2 qR ¼ 0 if s  cð1 aÞ;
qN ¼ Qð1aÞs2ð1aÞ qR ¼ scð1aÞ2ð1aÞa if Cð1 aÞ < s  Qð1 aÞ;
qN ¼ 0 qR ¼ Qacþs2a if Qð1 aÞ < s:
8>><
>:
This simple result may be useful in environments where myopic
decisions are sufficient. For example, the supply of cores may be
very large compared to the potential demand, so it is safe to treat
the supply of cores as ‘‘unconstrained” and adopt the policy above.
However, an important aspect of remanufacturing is that the pro-
duction in one period is dependent of the output in previous peri-
ods, so myopic decisions may be inefficient. In those cases, the
objective function of the remanufacturing company must recognize
that the production of remanufactured products is constrained by
the availability of cores at the beginning of each period.
We restrict the analysis to the cases in which only cores derived
fromnewproduct sales can be remanufactured. In otherwords, a gi-
ven itemcanonlyhave two lives:onceasanewproductandonceasa
remanufactured product. While one could remanufacture cores ex-
tracted from remanufactured products, it is usually not justifiable
on economic terms alone: cores obtained from remanufactured
products were usually built on previous technology, which renders
their design obsolete. Electronic componentsmay be obsolete; com-
ponents subject to mechanical stress (tires, engine blocks and axles,
turbine axles) start showing the consequences of fatigue, and so on.
So, it is reasonable to focus the analysis on products that are reman-
ufactured just once. This restriction reflects the fast obsolescence
rate of most industrial products because, although remanufacturing
older products might be technically feasible, the economic value is
low, and the process loses much of its interest.
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sider an infinite-horizon made of identical periods (Section 3.1), a
two-period horizon that considers end-of-period effects (Section
3.2) and finite horizons with three, four and five periods (Section
3.4). Mathematical proofs are included in the Appendix.
3.2. Infinite planning horizon
If the planning horizon is very long, we may approximate the
problem with the infinite planning horizon model. The infinite-
horizon case was discussed in Debo et al. (2005). We describe per-
iod 1 as the initialization period when the monopolist makes just
new products. Starting in period 2, the firm adopts a constant pol-
icy that may include a remanufactured item to serve the low end of
the market, as follows:
Max
p1 ;pN ;pR
ðp1  cÞq1 þ
b
1 b ððpN  cÞqN þ ðpR  c þ sÞqRÞ;
subject to
q1 ¼ Q  p1;
cq1  qR;
cqN  qR:
Moreover, qN and qR satisfy Eqs. (1) and (2), respectively, and all
variables satisfy the non-negativity constraint. We present the re-
sult without proof:
Theorem 1. There are three critical values, s1 < s2 < s3, defining four
scenarios:
D0: If s  cð1 aÞ ¼ s1, the remanufacturing process generates too
little savings. Hence, no remanufactured product is made, and the
case defaults to the standard monopoly policy:
p1 ¼ pN ¼
Q þ c
2




D1: If s1 < s  ð1aÞðQacþcÞ1þac ¼ s2, the remanufacturing process uses






Qð1 aÞ  s
2ð1 aÞ and qR ¼
s cð1 aÞ
2ð1 aÞa :
D2: If s2 < s  Qað1þ cÞ þ cð1 að2þ cÞÞ ¼ s3, the remanufac-
turing process uses just some of the cores collected in period 1,






Qð1þ acÞ  cð1þ cÞ þ sc
2þ 2acð2þ cÞ and qR ¼ cqN:
D3: When s3 < s, the remanufacturing process uses all cores col-
lected every period and makes these quantities:
q1 ¼ qN ¼
Qð1þ abcÞ  cð1þ bcÞ þ sbc
2þ 2abcð2þ cÞ and qR ¼ cqN:Fig. 1. Optimal policy for inThe following example illustrates these policies as the remanu-
facturing savings s vary in its domain ð0; cÞ. The potential demand
is 1000 units/period, customers are uniformly distributed from 0 to
1000, and the cost to make the new product is 600. Hence,
Q ¼ 1000; c ¼ 600. Moreover, let a ¼ 0:80; b ¼ 0:95; c ¼ 87%.
Fig. 1 illustrates this case, with critical values separating the four
scenarios at s1 ¼ 120 < s2 ¼ 152:8 < s3 ¼ 718:4. As in other exam-
ples in this article, scenario D3 is null because s3 > c. A counter-
intuitive observation is that the graphs are quite angular, often
not monotonic.
Here is an interpretation of these charts: As the remanufactur-
ing savings increase from 0 to 600 (the largest meaningful value of
s), the prices generally decrease, and the total quantity increases.
However, the number of new units made decreases as s changes
from 120 to 152.8, and it increases again for s > 152:8. Here is
the intuition: when 120 < s < 152:8, the savings in the remanufac-
turing process are limited. Hence, the price charged is not much
lower than the new product’s price, which leads to limited demand
for remanufactured products. In this range, not all cores are used,
and the firm can afford to charge full monopoly price for the new
product. Customers migrate from new to remanufactured prod-
ucts, shown in the graph as qN decreases and qR increases. Once
the remanufacturing savings reach the second threshold
ðs ¼ 152:8Þ the firm is able to offer the remanufactured product
at a price that creates demand for all cores. As the savings increase,
the remanufactured product becomes more profitable to the firm.
To take advantage of the greater savings, the firm lowers the price
of the new product to boost its sales, leading to more cores avail-
able for remanufacturing in subsequent periods. Since all cores
generated are remanufactured, the sales of new and remanufac-
tured products are directly related in this range, shown in the
graph as qN and qR increasing in seemingly parallel fashion.
3.3. Two-period planning horizon
If the company has a two-period planning horizon, one impor-
tant effect that was absent in the infinite-horizon model is intro-
duced: the end-game behavior. Since the monopolist does not
consider the supply or demand beyond the second period, the
remanufacturing potential of the new products made in period 2
is not recognized. A variation of this problem was addressed in
Ferguson and Toktay (2006). This simplified approach follows the
model presented in Ferrer and Swaminathan (2006):
Maxp1 ;p2N ;p2R ðp1  cÞq1 þ bððp2N  cÞq2N þ ðP2R  c þ sÞq2RÞ;
subject to
q1 ¼ Q  p1;
cq1  q2R:
Moreover, q2N and q2R satisfy Eqs. (1) and (2), respectively, and all
variables satisfy the non-negativity constraint. This leads to the fol-
lowing result:finite planning horizon.
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ðM ¼ 2Þ, there are three critical values, s21 < s22 < s23, which define
four scenarios representing the optimal policy:D20: When the remanufacturing savings satisfies
s  ð1 aÞ ¼ s21, no remanufactured product is made, and
the case defaults to the standard monopoly policy:
p1 ¼ p2N ¼
Q þ c
2




D21: When the remanufacturing savings satisfies
s21 < s  ðQacþ cð1 acÞÞð1 aÞ ¼ s22, the monopolist
makes both product types—albeit not using all cores derived





Qð1 aÞ  s
2ð1 aÞ and q2R ¼
s cð1 aÞ
2ð1 aÞa :
D22: When s22 < s  Qð1acð1bcþabcÞÞcð1acÞabc2 ¼ s23, the firm
makes both product types, using all cores available at the begin-
ning of period 2. The quantities produced are:
q1 ¼
Q  c þ ck
2
; q2N ¼
Qð1 aÞ  sþ k
2ð1 aÞ and q2R
¼ s cð1 aÞ  k
2ð1 aÞa ;
where k ¼ scð1aÞcað1aÞðQcÞ1þabc2ð1aÞ .
D23: When the remanufacturing savings satisfies s23 < s, the
monopolist uses all cores derived from sales in period 1, but
does not make new products in period 2. The quantities pro-
duced are:
q1 ¼
Q  c þ ck
2
; q2N ¼ 0 and q2R ¼
aQ  c þ s k=b
2a
;where k ¼ ðscð1acÞþaQð1cÞÞb1þabc2 .
Proof. See Appendix. h
We use the same market as in the previous example to illus-
trate. This time, however, the monopolist adopts a two-period
planning horizon, seen in Fig. 2. While the prices and quantities
represent the operational decisions that the firm makes on a regu-
lar basis, the remanufacturing savings parameter is a technological
choice made at the time the product was designed, as proposed by
Debo et al. (2005). Hence, it is useful to see how it affects the opti-
mal policy. The critical values separate the scenarios at
s21 ¼ 120 < s22 ¼ 175:7 < s23 ¼ 411:4. The first graph shows the
three quantities produced as a function of the remanufacturing
savings parameter, and the second shows the respective prices.
As the remanufacturing savings increase, prices decrease, and
total quantity increases. When 120 < s < 175:7, the remanufactur-
ing savings are not sufficient to generate a strong demand for theFig. 2. Optimal policy for 2-premanufactured product, so not all cores are used. Hence, the firm
maintains the standard monopoly price for the new product, and
customers gradually migrate from new to remanufactured prod-
ucts in the second period. When s  175:7, all cores are used,
and the firm lowers the price in the first period to generate more
cores for the second period. This allows an increase in the demand
of new product in first period and of remanufactured product in
second period, shown in the graph as q1 and q2R increasing to-
gether. To maintain demand, price for the remanufactured product
gradually decreases. This drives away the demand for new product
in second period, until eventually it is not offered.
The end-gaming behavior and the initialization process are
intertwined here: when remanufacturing is very profitable, pro-
duction in first period can be very large to enable a large reman-
ufacturing volume in the second period—a process that displaces
the new product from the market in period 2. Notice that the
new product price in second period is independent of the sav-
ings parameter. Likewise, the price of the remanufactured prod-
uct changes very little when s > s22. This implies that the
company has much to gain in improving its remanufacturing
capability (increasing s), because those gains directly affect the
bottom line. When s > s23, the new product is not made, and
the price of the remanufactured product reduces to help increase
its sales volume. The following corollaries, shown without proof,
are derived from direct observation of the structure of the opti-
mal policies:
Corollary 2.1
i. Lower manufacturing costs ð# cÞ or higher remanufacturing sav-
ings ð" sÞ reduce prices.
ii. Higher customer tolerance for remanufactured products ð" aÞ
increases the price for the remanufactured product.Corollary 2.2
iii. Higher customer tolerance ð" aÞ, higher collection rate ð" cÞ or
shorter replacement cycle ð" bÞ increases the proportion of
remanufactured products in the second period.
iv. Higher manufacturing cost ð" cÞ decreases the proportion of
new products in the second period.3.4. Multi-period planning horizon
Section 3.2 showed the end-gaming behavior that characterizes
the optimal policy when the planning horizon is only two periods
and known in advance. This section expands the analysis to longer
planning horizons, to reveal a pattern of behavior in the optimal
policy. If the firm has a multi-period planning horizon, the objec-
tive function is:eriod planning horizon.
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p1 ;pi;N ;pi;R
pM ¼ ðp1  cÞq1 þ
XM
i¼2




q1 ¼ Q  p1;
cq1  q2R;
cqi1;N  qi;R; i ¼ 3; . . . ;M:
All variables must satisfy the non-negativity constraint.
Consider the interior solution of this problem, in which the con-
straints are not binding. Since qi;N and qi;R must satisfy Eqs. (1) and




¼ Q þ c  2p1 ¼ 0;
@p
@pi;R
¼ bðcð1 aÞ  sþ 2ðapi;N  pi;RÞÞ
að1 aÞ ¼ 0; i ¼ 2; . . . ;M;
bp
@pi;N
¼ bðQð1 aÞ þ s 2ðpi;N  pi;RÞÞ
1 a ¼ 0; i ¼ 2; . . . ;M;








2ð1 aÞa ; i ¼ 2; . . . ;M; ð4Þ
qi;N ¼
Qð1 aÞ  s
2ð1 aÞ ; i ¼ 2; . . . ;M: ð5Þ
Eqs. (3)–(5) describe the interior solution for any planning horizon
M. This implies in a constant policy by which the number of units
sold is the same in every period i > 1, a behavior consistent with
scenarios D1 in the infinite-horizon and D21 in the two-period hori-
zon models. Now, define the slack variable di as the number of cores
collected at the end of each period and not used in the remanufac-
turing process of the following period. So, di ¼ cqi;N  qiþ1;R  0. In
the interior case, it can be described as:
d1 ¼ Qð1 aÞacþ cð1 aÞð1 acÞ  s2ð1 aÞa ; ð6Þ
di ¼ Qð1 aÞacþ cð1 aÞ  sð1þ acÞ2ð1 aÞa ; i ¼ 2; . . . ;M  1: ð7Þ
Based on Eqs. (3)–(7), we obtain the following result:
Theorem 3. If the monopolist has a planning horizon greater than 2
periods ðM > 2Þ, then:
a. The optimal policy includes remanufactured products if and only
if s > cð1 aÞ.
b. The optimal policy is an interior solution if and only if
cð1 aÞ < s < ð1aÞðQacþcÞ1þac .Proof. The inequality in part (a) ensures that the remanufacturing
quantity in Eq. (4) is positive. The optimization has an interior
solution if and only if the slack values are non-negative, as well
as qiR > 0 and qiN > 0. The inequality in part (b) ensures that
qiR > 0 and di > 0. It is simple to show that the values of s that sat-
isfy di > 0 will also satisfy d1 > 0 and qiN > 0. h
The values of s that define the interior solution are bounded by
the non-negativity of Eqs. (4) and (7). This theorem provides the
condition under which remanufacturing is economically viable in
a monopoly environment, regardless of the duration of the plan-
ning horizon. Notice that this result is consistent with Theorems
1 and 2. Consequently, if s satisfies the interior solution condition,shown in Theorem 3b, then the policy is the same regardless of the
length of the planning horizon. In addition, we have the following re-
sults, shown without proof:
Corollary 3.1. If M > 2 and s > ð1aÞðQacþcÞ1þac , then 8i  2; qiþ1;R ¼ cqiN .
Corollary 3.2. If M > 2 and s < ð1aÞðQacþcÞ1þac , the monopolist does not
display end-gaming behavior.
Corollary 3.1 says that if s is greater than that threshold, the
remanufacturing process in period 3 (or greater) uses all cores that
it collects. However, it says nothing about period 2, since the slack
variable d1 may still be positive when di ¼ 0. The corollary defines
the remanufacturing savings values for which some constraints in
the optimal policy are binding.
Notice that the periods in the life-cycle of a product may be sub-
ject to supply constraint (from earlier sales), demand constraint
(from future sales), or both. The first period, present in all models,
has just the demand constraint. The last period, absent in the infi-
nite-horizon model, has just the supply constraint. The interim
period, absent in the two-period model, is subject to both the sup-
ply and the demand constraints. The existence of each period type
shapes the model, and that is what makes the infinite and the two-
period horizon models unique.
To find the optimal policy for larger values of the remanufactur-
ing savings s, we write the Lagrangean of this optimization prob-
lem, using ki and li as the multipliers corresponding to the slack
variables and to the new product quantities in each period,
respectively.
LM ¼ pM þ k1ðcq1  q2RÞ þ
XM1
i¼2
ðkiðkqi;N  qiþ1;RÞ þ liqi;NÞ þ lMqM;N:
ð8Þ
If the planning horizon is M, there are 2ðM  1Þ Lagrangean
multipliers. Since each of them may be either zero or positive,
there could be as many as 22ðM1Þ possible solutions to the optimi-
zation; e.g., if M ¼ 5, there may be 256 solution sets to the opti-
mization. However, only a small number of these solutions satisfy
the non-negativity constraints, leading to the following conjec-
ture, which has been proven for planning horizons of 3, 4 and 5
periods:
If the monopolist has a planning horizon greater than 2 periods
ðM  3Þ, and the profit maximization is characterized by the
Lagrangean in (8), there are four critical values, sM1 < sM2 <
sM3 < sM4, defining five scenarios representing the optimal policy,
summarized in Table 1. The scenarios are:DM0: If s  sM1, the remanufacturing process generates too
little savings. Hence, no remanufactured product is made,
and the case defaults to the standard monopoly situation:




DM1: If sM1 < s  sM2, the monopolist makes both product
types, always using fewer cores than what is collected each




; q2N ¼    ¼ qMN ¼
Qð1 aÞ  s
2ð1 aÞ and
q2R ¼    ¼ q3R ¼
s cð1 aÞ
2ð1 aÞa :
DM2: If sM2 < s  sM3, the firm makes both product types and
uses all cores collected in every period. Hence,
qiþ1;R ¼ cqiN ;8i 2 f2; . . . ;M  1g.
DM3: If sM3 < s  sM4, the firm makes both product types and
uses all cores collected in every period. Hence, qiþ1;R ¼
cqiN;8i 2 f1; . . . ;M  1g.
Table 1
Scenarios characterizing the optimal policy for an M-period planning horizon.
Scenario Range Lagrangean multipliers New production Slack variables
l2  lM1 lM k1 k2  kM1 q2N  qM1;N qMN d1 d2  dM1
DM0 s < sM1 0 0 0 0 >0 >0 >0 >0
DM1 sM1 < s < sM2 0 0 0 0 >0 >0 >0 >0
DM2 sM2 < s < sM3 0 0 0 >0 >0 >0 >0 0
DM3 sM3 < s < sM4 0 0 >0 >0 >0 >0 0 0
DM4 sM4 < s 0 >0 >0 >0 >0 0 0 0
376 G. Ferrer, J.M. Swaminathan / European Journal of Operational Research 203 (2010) 370–379DM4: When sM4 < s, the monopolist remanufactures all cores
collected in every period, but it does not make new products
in the last period. Hence, qiþ1;R ¼ cqi;N;8i 2 f1; . . . ;M  1g
and qMN ¼ 0.
Scenarios DM0 and DM1 (with respective thresholds) have been
described in Theorem 3. The existence of scenario DM2 is postulated
in Corollary 3.1, which identifies the lower-bound sM2. Fig. 3 shows
the relative position of each of these scenarios, for any combination
of values of s and c with respect to Q. Notice that the scenarios are
bound by the inequality s < c < Q . Moreover, the successive
boundaries between the five scenarios intersect at the point
fc ¼ Q ; s ¼ ð1 aÞQg.
In what follows, we discuss the production quantities for sce-
narios DM2, DM3 and DM4 when the planning horizon is 3, 4 and 5
periods.
Theorem 4. If the monopolist has a planning horizon of 3, 4 or 5
periods (M ¼ 3;4 or 5, the critical values defining the non-interior
scenarios are given by the values in Table 3 (See appendix).Moreover,
the optimal policies in these scenarios are:Fig. 3.DM2: When sM2 < s  sM3, the firm always makes both prod-





ðs cð1 aÞÞ  ðki1 þ ackiÞ=bi1
2ð1 aÞa ; 8i 2 f2; . . . ;M  1g;
qiN ¼
ðQð1 aÞ  sÞ þ ðki1 þ ckiÞ=bi1
2ð1 aÞ ; 8i 2 f2; . . . ;M  1g;
qMN ¼
ðQð1 aÞ  sÞ þ kM1=bM1
2ð1 aÞ :DM3: When sM3 < s  sM4, the firm always uses all cores avail-
able to make remanufactured products ði > 1) qi;R ¼ cqi1;NÞ:Graphical representation of optimal policies in M-period planning horizon.q1 ¼




ðs cð1 aÞÞ  ðki1 þ ackiÞ=bi1
2ð1 aÞa ; 8i 2 f2; . . . ;M  1g;
qiN ¼
ðQð1 aÞ  sÞ þ ðki1 þ ckiÞ=bi1
2ð1 aÞ ; 8i 2 f2; . . . ;M  1g;
and qMN ¼
ðQð1 aÞ  sÞ þ kM1=bM1
2ð1 aÞ :DM4: When sM4 < s, the monopolist uses all cores available
ði > 1) qiR ¼ cqi1;NÞ, but does not make new products in
period M:q1 ¼




ðs cð1 aÞÞ  ðki1 þ ackiÞ=bi1
2ð1 aÞa ; 8i 2 f2; . . . ;M  1g;
qi;N ¼
ðQð1 aÞ  sÞ þ ðki1 þ ckiÞ=bi1
2ð1 aÞ ; 8i 2 f2; . . . ;M  1g;
and qMN ¼ 0:
Proof. See Appendix. h
The multipliers ðkiÞ differ in each scenario and in each planning
horizon, affecting the quantities produced with each situation. Let
the monopolist in the previous examples operate with a 3-period
planning horizon. Hence, Q ¼ 1000; c ¼ 600;a ¼ 0:8; b ¼ 0:95;
c ¼ 87%. The example in Fig. 4 illustrates. The critical values sepa-
rate the five scenarios at s31 ¼ 120 < s32 ¼ 152 < s33 ¼ 232 < s34 ¼
914. The two lower ranges of remanufacturing savings are similar
to the examples shown so far: the remanufactured product is not
offered when s  120, and when 120 < s < 152, some of the core
is remanufactured, with gradual migration of customers from the
new product to the remanufactured product in second and third
period. When s  152, all cores are remanufactured in third period,
shown in the graph by the similar increases of q2N and q3R, but not
all cores are remanufactured in second period. As the remanufac-
turing savings increase from 152 to 232, the remanufactured quan-
tity in second period continues to increase. This leads to a
reduction of new products in second period, and fewer cores inFig. 4. Optimal policy for the 3-period planning horizon.
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factured. As the remanufacturing savings increase past this thresh-
old, the monopolist increases the number of new products made in
first and second period to have more cores to remanufacture in
second and third period. This leads to a drop in demand of new
products in third period. We can recognize in the graph that when
s > s33, the remanufactured quantities in one period follow closely
the new product quantities in the previous period, reflecting the
result cqi1;N ¼ qiR. Notice that since s34 > c with these parameters,
scenario D34 is null, because the remanufacturing savings cannot
be greater than the cost to make the new product.
The illustration in Fig. 5 shows the 4-period planning horizon.
We use the same scenario as in the previous examples
(Q ¼ 1000; c ¼ 600;a ¼ 0:80; b ¼ 0:95 and c ¼ 87%), and M ¼ 4.
These parameters define the critical values for the optimal policy:
s41 ¼ 120; s42 ¼ 153; s43 ¼ 199; s44 ¼ 529. For better visibility, we
separate the result in three graphs as follows: the optimal policy
in period 1 appears as the upper-envelope in all three graphs.
Graphs a–c show the policy in periods 2–4, respectively. In all of
them, dashed lines represent remanufactured items; continuous
lines represent new product quantities.
Unlike the 3-period planning horizon, all critical values are in
the range ð0; cÞ, with this parameter set. It is surprising to see
how the remanufacturing savings affect the optimal policy,
depending on its relative position with the cutoff values, as illus-
trated in Fig. 5. For high values of s, the production of remanufac-
tured products increases with s in periods 2 and 4, but it is not very
sensitive to variations in s in period 3. The unusual shape of these
graphs can be easily explained: When 120 < s < 153, not all cores
are remanufactured in any period. Hence, as the remanufacturing
savings increase in this range, the demand in all periods gradually
migrates from new to remanufactured products. When s  153, all
cores in period 3 and 4 are remanufactured. As the remanufactur-
ing savings increase from 153 to 199, the demand for new products
continues to migrate from new to remanufactured products, grad-
ually consuming all cores in period 2. This reduces the availability
of cores for remanufacturing in period 3, leaving room for more
new products in period 3 (seen in Fig. 5b, as q3R decreases and
q3N increases). This generates more cores to remanufacture in per-
iod 4, reducing the demand for new products then. When s  199Þ,Fig. 5. Optimal policy in a 4-all cores are remanufactured in all periods. The price in period 1
gradually reduces (not shown) to induce greater demand then,
and more cores to remanufacture in period 2. This reduces the de-
mand for new products in period 2 and the core availability in per-
iod 3, allowing for more new product demand in the third period,
leading to more cores to remanufacture in period 4. Ultimately,
when remanufacturing savings are high, the firm alternates peri-
ods of high and low remanufacturing volumes, finishing with a
low volume of new products.
Another way to interpret this demand oscillation is to look at
the last period. In the last period, the firm plans to sell a low vol-
ume of new products, which do not generate additional income
through remanufacturing, and to meet most of last period’s de-
mand with remanufactured products. To enable this decision, a
high volume of new products must be made in the period before
last to generate the respective cores for the last period, so forth
and so on.
The optimal policy in the 5-period remanufacturing monopoly
is shown in Fig. 6, using the same parameters as in all other exam-
ples ðQ ¼ 1000; c ¼ 600;a ¼ 0:8; b ¼ 0:95; c ¼ 87%Þ. In this case,
the critical values are s51=120, s52 ¼ 153; s53 ¼ 217:4; s54 ¼ 701.
Again, we separate the result in four charts for better visibility,
and the optimal policy in period 1 appears as the upper-envelope
in all graphs. Graphs a–d show the policy in periods 2–5, respec-
tively. In all of them, dashed lines represent remanufactured quan-
tities, and continuous lines represent new product quantities.
When s  153, all cores are remanufactured in periods 3–5, but
the cores in period 2 are not fully consumed until s  217:4. Hence,
as the remanufacturing savings increase from 153 to 217.4, the de-
mand in period 2 continues to migrate from new products to
remanufactured products, without ever using all cores. Lower pro-
duction of new products in period 2 affects the availability of
remanufactured products, which are replaced by additional new
products in period 3, shown in graph b as a decrease of q3R while
q3N is increasing. Once s  217:4, all cores are consumed in all peri-
ods, so the producer increases the production of remanufactured
products each period by making more new products in the previ-
ous period.
The production of remanufactured products in one period is di-
rectly related to the production of new products in the previousperiod planning horizon.
Fig. 6. Optimal policy in a 5-period planning horizon.
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the same period, a consequence of the quantities defined by Eqs.
(1) and (2). Moreover, the new products made in the last period
do not generate additional revenue through remanufacturing.
Hence, the optimal policy recommends a drop in the production
of new products in the last period as the remanufacturing savings
increase, inducing larger production of remanufactured products
to meet the existing demand. This raises the demand for new prod-
ucts in the period before last and lowers the demand for remanu-
factured products in that period. This affects the production of new
products in period 3, and so on. The product line oscillation, alter-
nating high and low production of new products, is also present in
the 5-period planning horizon, dampened by the remanufacturing
yield (substantially lower than 100%), which requires the produc-
tion of new products to replace the cores lost each period.Table 2
Optimal qN in period 2 for different planning horizons.
Remanufacturing savings (s) Planning horizon (M)
2 3 4 5 1
200 55 105 75 95 125
300 29 115 74 99 139
400 3 143 72 115 1544. Conclusions and future research
Many companies have organized their product line based on
remanufacturing capabilities (e.g., makers of printer cartridges,
single-use cameras, tires, hospital beds, military equipment and
many other products.) Often, they operate in a monopoly or qua-
si-monopoly environment. This paper analyzes a monopoly in
which the new and remanufactured products are clearly differenti-
ated. We characterize the optimal pricing and production strategy
under finite (two, three, four and five periods) and infinite planning
horizons of a remanufacturing monopolist, to identify patterns in
the optimal policy.
An over-arching observation is that, as the marginal cost of
remanufacturing decreases, the value of making new products in
the first period increases, and the value of making new products
in future periods decreases. In other words, if remanufacturing is
very profitable, the firm forgoes some of the early period margins
by supplying additional units in the first period to increase the
number of cores available for remanufacturing later. So, the opti-
mal policy for the finite problem is dynamic: each period, the firm
should produce a different quantity of new and a different quantity
of remanufacturing products. This quantity is driven by the need
for cores (used products) in the following period. However, there
is another effect that comes into play, related to the amount of
remanufactured products in the interim periods: If more remanu-factured products are sold in the current period, a partial cannibal-
ization puts pressure on the amount of new products that can be
sold at the same time. This, in turn, impacts the number of reman-
ufactured savings that can be realized in the next period, leading to
situations in which it is optimal not to remanufacture more in the
interim periods—even though remanufacturing savings increase –
to enable a higher number of cores available for remanufacturing
in the last period of the life-cycle.
Our study shows the impact of the planning horizon on the
firm’s optimal policy. We illustrated this result with 5 examples
that were identical in every aspect, except regarding their planning
horizons. As seen in the figures, the optimal policy for a given per-
iod is different for each planning horizon (M). In our example, if the
remanufacturing savings is $300, the optimal number of new items
to make in period 2 can be as low as 29 (M=2) and as high as 139
ðM ¼ 1Þ. See Table 2. This is another evidence that proper man-
agement of remanufacturing systems require careful long term
planning.
This article helps understanding the life-cycle of a product,
starting from an offering of just all-new products to a mixed prod-
uct line, in which remanufactured and new products coexist. By
analyzing the two-, three-, four- and five-period problems and
characterizing the optimal policy, we are able to conjecture the
optimal policy for a larger M-period, finite-horizon problem. If
the remanufacturing savings is greater than the internal solution
threshold, the product line oscillates from period to period: the
segmentation in the last period has more remanufactured products
and fewer new products, the period before that has the opposite
segmentation, and so on.
As this area of research expands, it is important to understand
the complete lifecycle of the remanufactured product line. For
G. Ferrer, J.M. Swaminathan / European Journal of Operational Research 203 (2010) 370–379 379example, the impact of demand variability deserves attention.
What would happen to the optimal policy if the stream of demands
throughout the life-cycle were stochastic? What if it were known,
but variable? Considering that our model does not allow the firm
to save the cores to remanufacture in future periods, the stochastic
problem would have components typical of the Newsboy model.
Possibly, new product manufacture will show the same oscillating
pattern that we already saw in our study, with a correction that
will be affected by the relative size of the underage and the overage
costs, and the remanufactured production will follow. The case of
the variable and known demand would add a new set of con-
straints to our current model, which will probably limit the analy-
sis to a few periods. We plan to explore those issues in a future
study.
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